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3Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
The past, present and future of Mad Cow Disease in the United States.
I. Introduction
The food we eat in the United States is among the safest in the world. We
are not faced each morning with case after case of food poisoning as we listen
to the news or read the newspaper. We feel very safe going to a restaurant,
supermarket, or even a roadside stand to purchase food for our families and
pets. We do not fear food-borne diseases. Nor do we fear the consequences
of the drugs and food additives we give our pets and food-producing animals.
These drugs and food additives are among the most thoroughly tested and safest
in the world.1
Despite the extensive precautions taken by our government to ensure the
safety of our nation's food supply, some food-borne illnesses do occur. The
Food and Drug Administration and other governmental agencies must con-
stantly monitor outbreaks of food-borne illnesses around the world and devise
precautionary measures to prevent similar outbreaks in the United States. Re-
cently, a variant form of a terminal disease, known as Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease,
has manifested itself in several countries, including
'http://www.cvm.fda.gov/default.htmI, page 1.
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4the United States. Governmental agencies and health organizations around the
globe are desperately attempting to ascertain the cause of this disease while also
attempting to devise strategies to minimize the likelihood of a future outbreak.
In an attempt to provide an introductory, yet thorough, discussion of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy and its ramications in the United States, this
paper shall:
discuss the history of and explain the disease known as Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy; explain Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease; outline the history, respon-
sibility and structure of the Food and Drug Administration Center for Vet-
erinary Medicine; provide a comparative analysis of the steps that the United
States and other countries have taken to minimize the threat of future outbreaks
of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease; provide
a brief overview of the Food and Drug Administration's rule prohibiting the use
of animal proteins in ruminant feed; and nally discuss the adequacy of said rule
as well as other possible steps the FDA and USDA could take to further min-
imize the threat of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Creutzfeldt-Jakob
Disease in the United States.
II. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
A. Introduction
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (B SE) is associated with a transmissible
agent (the prion), the nature of which is not yet fully understood. The agent
aects the brain and spinal cord of cattle and is characterized by sponge-like
changes in the brain and spinal tissue. It is a highly stable agent, resisting levels
of heat from normal cooking
2
5temperatures up to those used for sterilization, freezing and drying. The disease
is fatal to cattle within weeks to months of its outset.2
BSE is a disease found in cattle which was rst identied in 1987. The
animals aected become unsteady on their feet, lose weight and often assume
a fearful disposition. The term Mad Cow Disease is not always appropriate as
many animals do not become overtly aggressive, and towards the end, may lose
interest in their surroundings, and become too unsteady to even stand.3
B. History of BSE
On March 20, 1996, the British government announced a possible link be-
tween Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), a chronic disease aecting the
central nervous system of cattle, and ten cases of a variant form of Creutzfeldt-
Jacob Disease (CJD), a related disease among humans. At a World Health
Organization consultation in April, a group of international experts concluded
that there is no denite link between BSE and the new variant CJD, but that
epidemiological evidence suggests exposure to BSE may be the most likely ex-
planation for the ten cases of variant CJD in the United Kingdom.4 In October
1996, John Collinge, one of the foremost British authorities on CJD, and his
colleagues published results of their research on various strains of prions, which
are thought to transmit BSE. Their results suggest that the new variant CJD
resembles BSE rather than other forms of CJD.5
2 World Health Organization, Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases
(EMC), Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (B5E) Fact Sheet; WHO Fact Sheet N 113 March
1996.
~ Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: A Guide; http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/booklet.html
4http://www.cvm.fda.gov/fdalinfores/updates/bse/bsefact.html
~ Id.
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6C. Estimated Risk in the United States
In ten years of monitoring for BSE, the USDA has never identied a sin-
gle case of BSE in the United States. However, scrapie, another transmissible
spongiform encephalopathy (TSE), does exist in the US livestock population in
an apparently low number of cases.6 Since 1989, no cattle have been imported
from countries with conrmed cases of naturally occurring BSE. In addition,
no beef has been imported from foreign countries with native cattle cases of
BSE since 1985. Although BSE remains a disease among cattle in some foreign
countries, the US government is taking steps to even further reduce the risk of
BSE and enhance surveillance and study of CJD among humans.7
Despite our inability to identify the presence of BSE in the US, the specter
of BSE continues to haunt beef eaters on both sides of the Atlantic. Britain is
still trying to persuade the European Union to lift its ban on British Beef, and
in April of 1997 the commodity prices for beef sank in the United States after
Joseph Gabor, an Indiana farmer, died of CJD.8 Cattle pries also sank a year
earlier in April of 1996 when talk-show host Oprah Winfrey partly explored
Mad Cow Disease on her daily talk show.9
Although the risk from eating meat or other products from BSE aected
animals is almost certainly remote, any theoretical risk has been minimized by
the destruction of all aected animals, and the ban on the use of certain tissues
from cattle for human
6 WHO consultation on Public Health Issues Related to BSE and
the Emergence of a New Variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, 2-3 April 1996,
conclusions summarized in Weekly Epidemiological Record, 1996, No. 15 (12
April 1996).
~ CVM BSE and CJD Fact Sheet dated January 2, 1997.
8 Don't Be Cowed by This Disease; by Scott C. Ratzan, The Wall Street Journal,
May 11, 1997.
~ Oprah Winfrey Show; April 16,1996. The show's topic was food
safety. After the airing of the show, the April futures contract sank the daily
allowable limit of 1.5 cents a pound.
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7consumption. The FDA has also promulgated special rules intended to pre-
vent the establishment and amplication of BSE in the United States through
exposure to contaminated animal feed.'0
III. Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
A. What is Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJID)?
CJD is a rare, fatal brain disorder of unknown cause which produces a rapid,
progressive dementia and associated neuromuscular disturbances. The disease
is often referred to as a subacute spongiform encephalopathy because it usually
produces microscopic vacuoles that appear sponge-like.
The identication of this transmissible agent has been the subject of much
scientic inquiry and debate. Initially the agent was thought to be a slow
virus due to the unusually long incubation period between the time of exposure
to the pathogen and the onset of symptoms. Further research, however, has
indicated that this agent diers signicantly from viruses and other conventional
agents. Whereas viruses and other known infectious agents contain nucleic acids
which house a cell's genetic material, researchers have been unable to identify
any nucleic acids in the CJD agent. Additionally, the chemical and physical
procedures that inactivate most viruses have proved ineective in decreasing
the infectivity of the CJD pathogen. In contrast, the
10 See 21 Code of Federal Regulations Part 589; Federal Register: June 5,
1997 (Volume 62, No. 108); page
30935.
CJD Brochure Website produced by the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Founda-
tion @ http://members.aol.com/crjakob/brochure.html. Page 1.
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8procedures that degrade protein have been found to inactivate the pathogen.
Accordingly, a new theory regarding the transmissible agent has emerged and
recently gained widespread acceptability. This theory holds that the transmis-
sible agent is neither a virus nor other previously known infectious agent, but
rather an unconventional agent consisting of protein. This newly-discovered
pathogen is called prion, short for proteinaceous infectious particle. Prions are
thought to transform normal, benign protein molecules into infectious, deadly
ones by altering the shape of the healthy molecules to the dangerous confor-
mation. At the present time, there is no known eective treatment or cure for
CJD. The disease is inevitably fatal.'2
B. Historical Note
Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease was named after the two doctors from Austria
(H.G. Creutzfeldt and A. Jakob) who in 1920 separately described a total of
six patients with peculiar neurological illnesses. Although the illnesses were not
very similar, the appearances of the brain when viewed under the microscope
were alike; many of the normal brain nerve cells had died, and the brain had
developed numerous tiny holes, too small to be seen by the naked eye, and a
meshwork of delicate bers. The entire appearance resembled a microscopic
sponge, and thus was born the expression spongiform encephalopathy.'3
12 Id.
See Note 3.
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9C. Occurrence
CJD occurs worldwide, from Chile to Japan, and from Australia to the
United States. There is approximately one new case per two million people per
year, and about 30 cases occur per year in the United Kingdom. The most
common age of onset is over the age of 55, but it appears to be rare over the
age of 80.'~
D. Transmission
CJD can be transmitted through infection, however the issue of whether
there is a direct link between the exposure to diseased animals and the acquisi-
tion of CTh has been the subject of much scientic study and debate. British
scientists and the World Health Organization (WHO) have reversed their pre-
vious positions and have stated that there is a possible link between BSE and
CJD.'5 This new acknowledgment arose from the identication of an apparently
new strain of CJD which was discovered in 10 people under the age of 42, in-
cluding some teenagers. Additionally ve of the people were associated with the
meat and livestock industry. Scientists advising the British government decided
that the most likely explanation for this unusual outbreak was the consumption
of beef from diseased cattle before 1989, when regulations were adopted for the
disposal of potentially infectious cattle oal, including brains, and the use of
sheep entrails as feed ceased.'6
'~ Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: A Guide; Produced by The University of Ed-
inburgh and The UK CreutzfeldtJakob Disease Surveillance Unit. This guide
may be found at
http://www.cjd.ed.ac.ukibooklet/htm.
'~ See Note 4.
'61d.
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10E. Description of CJD
The following are features of CJD as described in the CJD handbook pro-
duced by the University of Edinburgh and The UK Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Surveillance Unit.'7
The exact time of onset of the illness can be very dicult to determine. Of-
ten, at rst, there are subtle lapses of memory for day-to-day events, although
sometimes mood changes, in particular a loss of interest and withdrawal from
involvement in social activities, are apparent. Decline in ability at work for tasks
that were previously simple is often noted. At this point, the illness may be
passed o by friends, relatives and doctors as mild depression. However, within
a few weeks other features quickly appear: a vague unsteadiness and hesitancy
in walking, deteriorating vision (often the patient may mistake everyday objects
for something else, or even experience hallucinations), slight slurring and slow-
ing of speech, and a diculty in nding the right word when trying to hold a
conversation. Symptoms often continue to progressively worsen, with the devel-
opment of incontinence of urine, jerky movements, shakiness, stiness of limbs,
and loss of the ability to move or speak.
Mercifully, only in the very early stages are the patients aware of anything
amiss, and usually complain of clumsiness, feeling muddled, or blurring of eye-
sight. As the disease progresses, patients lose awareness of their surroundings
and of their disabilities. Some of the agitation that may be seen is a reex
phenomenon rather than true distress. This is particularly the case as regards
the shakiness.
Individuals aected by CJD usually succumb within six months of the onset
of the disease, often through pneumonia. In only 10% of cases does the disease
run a more
8
11'7 See Note 14.
IS See Note 2.
'~ The Prion Diseases by Stanley B. Prusiner; located at http://www.nmia.comkmdibble/prion.html.
prolonged course of 2-5 years, and in these cases, the rst years may only
involve loss of memory and some diculty with complex tasks. Sadly, there is
no known cure or treatment that can halt the progress of the disease. However,
there are many drugs which can be used to make the last weeks and months
easier for the suerer.
F. Britain
Between May 1995 and March 1996 ten humans in the United Kingdom were
identied with what appears to be a variant of CJD. Eight of the ten patients
to date have died. These ten cases all occurred in patients under the age of 42
years and some had behavioral changes at the onset. All ten cases experienced
the prolonged course of the disease.'8
G. Discussion of Prions
Protein rods known as Prions, once dismissed as an impossibility, have
now gained wide recognition as extraordinary agents that cause a number of
infectious, genetic and spontaneous disorders. Fifteen years ago dogma held
that the conveyers of transmissible diseases required genetic material, composed
of nucleic acid (DNA or RNA), in order to establish an infection in a host. Even
viruses, among the simplest microbes, rely on such material to direct synthesis
of the proteins needed for survival and replication. Today, however, a wealth of
experimental and clinical data has made a convincing case that prions are indeed
responsible for transmissible and inherited disorders of protein conformation. '~
9
1220 Id.
The known prion diseases, all fatal, are sometimes referred to as spongiform
encephalopathies. They are so named because, as previously mentioned, they
frequently cause the brain to become riddled with holes. Prion diseased are
widespread in animals, with BSE being the most worrisome. The human prion
diseases such as CJD are more obscure.20
IV. FDA Center for Veterinary Medicine
A. Overview
The responsibility for protecting and assuring the unparalleled level of con-
sumer condence and food supply safely rests with the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) and with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
Within the FDA, there are two Centers responsible for the safety and whole-
someness of the human food supply. The Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition (CSFAN) regulates food intended for human consumption. The Cen-
ter for Veterinary Medicine (FDA-C VM) regulates the manufacture and dis-
tribution of food additives and drugs that will be given to animals from which
human foods are derived, as well as food additives and drugs for pets (and
companion animals).
The FDA-CVM regulates the manufacture and distribution of drugs and
feed additives intended for animals. These include animals from which human
foods are derived (i.e. poultry, cattle and sheep), as well as drugs and feed
additives for household pets. CVM is responsible for regulating drugs, devices,
and feed additives given to, or
10
13used on, over one hundred million companion animals, plus millions of poultry,
cattle, swine, sheep, and minor animal species.2'
B. FDA-CVM Beginnings
In order to better understand the role of the CVM, it may be useful to look
at the Center's historical background. Additionally, a cursory examination of
the developmental history of the watchdog roles played by the FDA and USDA
may facilitate an understanding of the present role each agency should play in
preventing outbreaks of BSE and CJD in the United States.
WHEREAS some evilly disposed persons, from motives of avarice and lthy
lucre, have been induced to sell diseased, corrupted, contagious or unwholesome
provisions, to the great nuisance ofpublic health and peace: Be it therefore en-
acted by the Senate and House of representatives, in General Court assembled,
and by the authority of the same, that if any person shall sell any such diseased,
corrupted, contagious or unwholesome provisions, whether for meat or drink,
knowing the same without making it known to the buyer, and being thereof
convicted before the Justices of the General Sessions of the Peace, in the county
where such oense shall be committed, or the Justices of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court, he shall be punished by ne, imprisonment, standing in the pillory,
and binding to the good behavior, or one or more of these punishments, to be
inicted according to the degree and aggravation of the oense.22
The regulation of food in the United States dates back to 1784, when Mas-
sachusetts enacted the rst general food law. National drug control began in
1848 with the Import Drugs Act. This was the rst Federal Statute designed
to guarantee the quality of medicines. In 1850, the rst Pure Food and Drug
Law was passed by the State of California. Eventually, most of the other states
enacted similar legislation. In 1880,
21 http://www.cvm.fda.gov/default.html, page 2.
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14after a year's investigation into food and drug alteration, Mr. Peter Collier,
Chief of the Division of Chemistry at the USDA, began advocating enactment
of a national food and drug law. Mr. Collier was succeeded in 1883 by Dr.
Harvey W. Wiley, who embarked on a long and stormy crusade for reforms.23
In 1906, the rst Federal Food and Drugs Act was signed into law by pres-
ident Theodore Roosevelt. The Act was administered by USDA's Bureau of
Chemistry; it prohibited the interstate shipment of adulterated or misbranded
food, drinks and drugs. The practices existing in the food industry at that time
were reected in the restrictions spelled out by the Act. In essence, food was
declared adulterated, or unt for consumption if:
it is mixed or packed with another substance so as to
reduce or lower or injuriously aect its quality or strength Wany substance has
been substituted wholly ore in part; ~f any valuable constituent has been wholly
or in part abstracted, Wit has been colored, powdered, coated, or strained to
conceal damage or inferiority; Wpoisonous or deleterious substances have been
added; Wit consists wholly or in part olthy, putrid, or decomposed animal or
vegetable substance, or any portion of an animal unt for food; or Wthe product
is from a diseased animal or one that died otherwise than by slaughter.24
Dr. Carl I. Alsberg, who succeeded Dr. Riley as USDA's Chief Chemist in
1912, initiated the regulatory and research function of the Bureau of Chemistry
with an investigation of drug labeling to determine if the claims were false
or misleading. By 1921, attention was directed toward truthful labeling as it
applied to quantity information, such as net weight, particularly in wrapped
meats. In 1927, a separate law enforcement
22 Massachusetts Law of 1785
23 http://www.cvm.fda.gov/fdaIaboutcvmlbeginnings.html
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15agency was formed, known rst as the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administra-
tion, and later as the Food and Drug Administration. The agency employed its
rst veterinarian, Dr. Henry Moskey, to evaluate vitamins and minerals in light
of their claimed nutritional and treatment uses. In 1938, the more stringent and
inclusive Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (The Act) was enacted. For the
rst time, manufacturers were required to provide evidence of product safety
before distributing new drugs. The Act also granted FDA explicit authority to
conduct factory inspections and to use court injunctions as enforcement tools, in
addition to prior available penalties of seizure and prosecution. Other provisions
stipulated the establishment of acceptable tolerances for unavoidable poisonous
substances. FDA was transferred in 1940 from USDA to the Federal Security
Agency, and the Oce of Commissioner of Food and Drugs was established.25
The Durham-Humphrey Amendment of 1951 required that human drugs
which cannot be safely used without medical supervision must be dispensed
only on the prescription of a licensed practitioner, and must bear the Rx leg-
end. The veterinary prescription legend was subsequently eected through a
rulemaking procedure. In 1953, the Federal Security Agency became part of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW), and the following year
FDA was organized into ve Bureaus, including a Bureau of Medicine. With the
establishment of this Bureau, a Veterinary Medical Branch was created with Dr.
John Collins as the rst chief. The Branch's primary function was to determine
the safety of animal drugs, both for animals and for consumers of food derived
from treated animals. The great expansion in the development
24 Id.
25 Id.
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1626 Id.
27 Id.
and use of animal drugs and medicated feeds during this period presaged
the increasingly prominent role that veterinary medicine was to play in FDA
and in animal and human health. By 1959, the Veterinary Medical Branch had
developed into a Division headed by Dr. Charles G. Durbin. The Food Additive
Amendments of 1958 expanded regulatory authority over animal food additives
and drug residues in animal-derived foods.26
Enactment of the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962 brought the
most signicant and sweeping changes in The Act since its passage 24 years
earlier. These Amendments authorized FDA to monitor the clinical trials of
investigational drugs and strengthened the agency's factory inspection authority.
For the rst time, manufacturers were required to test new drugs for eectiveness
as well as safety before clearing them for marketing. The Amendments also
imposed a retroactive ecacy requirement for drugs previously approved for
safety alone. Furthermore, the Amendments required manufacturers to report
promptly to FDA any adverse reaction or eects and other clinical experience
relative to the safety and ecacy of drugs already on the market. Additional
provisions stipulated that new drugs may not be cleared for marketing if the
labeling is in any way false or misleading.27
Animal drugs were regulated under three sections of the Act. They were rst
regulated as either new drugs under Section 505, or as antibiotics under Section
507. If used in the feed or drinking water of food-producing animals they were,
in addition, regulated as food additives under Section 409. In September 1965,
recognizing the importance of animal health to the country, the Secretary of
DHEW established the
14
17Bureau of Veterinary Medicine (BVM). Dr. M.R. Clarkson was the Bureau's
rst director. In 1968, the Act was amended to include the animal drug provi-
sions of each of these Sections under a new Section 512. In 1984, BVM became
the Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM).28
C. FDA CVM Responsibilities
The responsibilities of the CVM have a direct eect on the safety of the
human food supply and on the safety to animals of veterinary products. CVM
works to educate consumers as well as regulated industry; evaluates data on
proposed veterinary products before permitting them to be marketed; discovers
violative marketed products through surveillance programs and initiates legal
action, if necessary, to bring violators into compliance with the law; and con-
ducts research to support Center activities.29
D. FDA CVM Research
Decisionmaking within CVM must reect the state of the art in science and
technology. In order to maintain the level of scientic credibility necessary to
support the authority of regulatory decisions, it is essential that CVM scientists
be involved in the conduct of research programs that reect scientic excellence.
The Oce of Science conducts intramural research and coordinates extramural
research grants and contracts that support pre- and post-marketing respon-
sibilities by providing information to aid CVM scientists in their review and
decisionmaking process.30
The research group's responsibilities include the following:
28 Id.
2Oh~://wcvmfdagov/fda/aboutcv~s~cth~l
3Ohup://wwwcvmfdagov/fda/aboutcvmIres~chtnIl
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 Develops and validates quantitative, qualitative analytical proce-
dures for analyzing drugs, additives, and contaminants in animal tissues and
food.
 Investigates the absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excre-
tion of drugs, feed additives, and contaminants in food animals.
 Investigates the eects of drugs, food additives, and contaminants
on immunological and physiological functions of domestic animals.
 Investigates interactions between diet and drugs in food producing
animals.3'
Clearly the Oce of Science's high standards of scientic excellence will
require it to dedicate signicant resources to the study of Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy in order to develop a better understanding of how the disease
is transmitted. More specically, enormous amounts of research will be required
to develop a satisfactory understanding of prions. In the interim, most actions
taken by the FDA to minimize the potential risk of BSE and CJD in the United
States will be based on highly speculative and controversial information.
V. Actions to Minimize BSE Risk
A. World Health Organization Recommendations
At a consultation organized by the World Health Organization (WHO) in
Geneva, Switzerland from April 2-3, a group of international experts reviewed
the public health issues related to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and the
emergence of a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, as ocially reported
by the United Kingdom on March
16
1920.32 The advisors made recommendations to minimize the poten-
tial transmission of BSE among animals and to reduce human exposure to the
BSE agent. The WHO
recommendations listed below are followed by notations on how each recom-
mendation related to the United states as of November of 1 996.~~
Recommendation #1
No part of any animal that has shown signs of transmissible spong~form
encephalopathy (TSE) should enter any food chain, human or animal. All
coun fries must ensure the slaughter and safe disposal of TSE -aected animals
so that TSE infectivity
cannot enter any food chain. All countries should review their rendering
procedures to ensure that they eectively inactivate TSE agents.
In 10 years of monitoring for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, the USDA
has never identied a single case in the United States except the one the was
assumed from a cow that was fed to a farm full of mink and seemed to cause
an outbreak of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (the Stetsonville out-
break). However, scrapie (another TSE) does exist in the US livestock popula-
tion in an apparently low number of cases.34 To
allay concern about the possible spread of TSEs, the rendering industry
previously
implemented a voluntary ban on the use of adult sheep in ruminant feed.
On March
29,1996, the beef and sheep industry announced it was implementing a vol-
untary ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feed, as another safeguard against BSE.
It should be remembered
32 WHO Consultation on Public Health Issues Related to BSE and the
Emergence of a New Variant of
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, 2-3 April 1996, conclusions summarized in Weekly
Epidemiological Record, 1996, No. 15 (12 April 1996).
~ Id. Note, November 1993 is prior to the date that 21 CFR Part
589 became eective. See Part V.C. of this paper for a discussion of2l CFR 589
which prohibits the use of certain animal protein
products in ruminant feed.
17
20that this is an extremely expensive thing to have done as large amounts of ren-
dering products will now have to be fed to pigs and chickens instead, and more
expensive materials used for cattle. Presently, USDA veterinarians condemn an-
imals with neurologic signs on antemorten inspection. The National Renderers
Association is initiating research studies to determine whether their procedures
inactivate TSE agents. Dr. Don Franco, director of scientic services for the
NRA, told Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association (JAVMA),
What were considering doing is very complex research to decide the time and
temperature [needed] to inactivate the prion
diseases.
Note: rendering plants are factories that melt carcasses and waste meat
products into protein used in animal feeds, cosmetics, nutritional supplements,
medicines and other products. As little as one teaspoon of feed derived from a
infected bovine can transmit the disease to another cow. In the US, rendering
plants process billions of pounds of protein from dead cows, sheep, pigs, chickens
and other animals into animal feed each
year.35 36
Recommendation #2
All countries should establish continuous surveillance and compulsory notica-
tion for BSE, according to recommendations established by the Oce Interna-
tional des Epizooties in Paris. In the absence of surveillance data, the BSE
status
~ See Note 5.
The U.S. Mad Cow Cover-Up; Earth Island Journal; by John Stauber and Shel-
don Rampton. Article found on-line at http://www.greenlink.orgIamity/101196/madcow.html.
36 that 21 CFR Part 589, as discussed below, codied WHO Recommendation
#1 by placing a ban on all mammalian-to-ruminant feed. Additionally, 21 CFR
Part 589 established a system of exible controls to ensure that US rendering
plants eectively inactivate TSE agents.
18
21of a country must be considered as unknown. As BSE is not known to exist
in the United States, the measures taken have been in surveillance, prevention
and education. Import restrictions have been in place since 1989, and active
surveillance eorts began in 1990. In its surveillance program, the USDA has
examined over 2,791 brain specimens from cattle in 43 states, and BSE has
never been detected
The USDA-FSIS has now expanded its sampling of animals with neurologic
signs. In the United States, BSE is a reportable disease under Title 9 Code of
Federal Regulations, Parts 71 and 161.
Recommendation # 3
Countries where BSE exists in native cattle should not permit tissues that are
likely to contain the BSE agent to enter any food chain, human or animal.
BSE does not exist in the US domestic cattle population. Moreover, while
research to date does not show connection with meat; the brain, spinal cord,
and retina from natural infected animals have been found to be infective. Addi-
tionally, the caudal portion of the ileum from inoculated cattle was also found
to be infective.
Recommendation # 4
All countries should ban the use of ruminant tissues in ruminant feed
At the time of this WHO recommendation, the United States did not re-
strict the feeding of ruminant-derived meat and bonemeal to cattle. However,
on March 29,1996, several national livestock organizations and professional an-
imal health organizations announced they would immediately establish an ag-
gressive, voluntary program to ensure that ruminant-derived protein is not used
in ruminant feed products. Issuing the joint
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statement were the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, American Sheep
Industry Association, National Milk Producers Federation, AVMA, AABP, and
Association of American Veterinary Medical Colleges. The USDA and US Public
Health Service supported these voluntary measures. As recommended by the
industry groups, the FDACVM has since promulgated regulations prohibiting
ruminant protein in ruminant feeds.37
Recommendation # 5
With respect to specic products: Tests on milk from BSE-infected animals have
not shown any BSE infectivity, and there is evidence from other animal and
human spong~orm encephalopathies to suggest that milk will not transmit these
diseases. Milk and milk products, even in countries with high incidence of BSE,
are, therefore, considered safe. Gelatin is considered safe for human consump-
tion, since its preparation involves a chemical extraction process that destroys
BSE infectivity. Tallow is likewise considered safe, Weective rendering proce-
dures are in place.
With respect to medicinal products, which derfrom food in that they can be
in]ected as well as taken orally, measures to minimize the risk of transmitting the
BSE agent were developed at a previous WHO consultation in 1991 and continue
to be applicable. As more information becomes available, these measures will be
reviewed and strengthened, Wnecessary.
Recommendation # 6
The importance of obtaining materials destined for the pharmaceutical industry
from countries that have a BSE surveillance system in place and report either
no or
20
23sporadic cases of BSE is reiterated Removal and inactivation procedures con-
tribute to reduced risk of infection. But it must be recognized that the BSE agent
is remarkably resistant to physicochemical procedures that destroy the infectivity
of common microorganisms.
In the Unites States, the FDA regulates the use of cattle derivatives in prod-
ucts destined for human use, such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and medical
devices. In the Federal Register, the FDA has advised against using cattle-
derived materials from countries aected with BSE. Since 1989, APHIS regu-
lations have restricted the importation of most ruminant materials from BSE-
aected countries.38
Recommendation # 7
Research on TSE should be promoted, especially on rapid diagnosis, agent char-
acterization, and epidemiology of TSEs in human beings and animals.
The USDA recently has called for further BSE research in the United States.
The United States is currently the world's main center for research into TSEs
with six major research centers.
B. British Legislation
The United Kingdom, which has experienced more cases of fatal BSE and
CJD than any other country in the world, has taken extensive steps to minimize
the occurrence of BSE and CJD in Britain. The following sequence of sample
UK legislation, as
38 These references to the Federal Register and APHIS regulations are con-
tained in the above referenced
1996 WHO recommendations. I was unable to ascertain the exact location
of such regulations.
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24reported by the Institute for Food Science and Technology39, provides a useful
model of steps that could be taken in the US to reduce the threat of BSE and
CJD in the US.
1988:
1. The Bovine Svongiform Encephalopathy Order 1988 (S.i 1988/1
039) coming into force 21s1 June 1988. Provided for compulsory notication
of BSE / suspected BSE; veterinary investigation; prohibition on sale and sup-
ply for feeding to ruminants and the feeding to ruminants of any feeding stu
in which animal protein has been incorporated.
2. The Bovine Svonziform Encephalopathy (Amendment) Order 1988 (S.i
1 988/1346). Enables the Minister to cause animals to be slaughtered on
account of BSE.
3. The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Compensation Order 1988 (S.i
1988/1346). Prescribes the amount of compensation payable for bovines
slaughtered on account of BSE (50% for conrmed cases, 100% for negative
cases, both subject to a ceiling).
1990:
4. The Bovine Svongiform Encephalopathy Compensation Order 1990 (S.i
1990/222). Changed amount of compensation payable for animals slaugh-
tered on account of BSE (full compensation for aected animals, subject to a
ceiling).
5. The Bovine Animals (Identication. Markinz and Breedin2 Records) Order 1990 (Si 1990/1867).
Requires bovine animals to be identied by an approved
~ The Institute of Food Science and Technology (UK), through its Public Af-
fairs and Technical & Legislative Committees, authorized a Position Statement,
dated 9 September 1997. See part 6/6. BSE Legislation Appendix.
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25identication; introduces new record keeping arrangements requiring cattle farm-
ers to maintain breeding records for ten years.
1991:
6. The Export of Goods (Control) (A mendment No. 7) Order 1991 (S.i
1991/1583). Controls exports to third countries of bovine oal, protein
derived from bovine oal and feedingstus containing such oal or protein.
1995:
7. The Fresh Meat (Hv~'iene and Inspection) Regulations 1995 (S.i
1995/539). Requires meat cutting premises to remove spinal cord from
bovines over six months of age, and removal and collection of obvious nervous
and lymphatic tissue and prohibition on its use for human consumption.
8. The Specied Bovine Oal (SBO) Order 1995 (S.I. 1995/613). Consoli-
dates and streamlines rules on SBO; places tighter controls on record keeping;
creates procedures for rendering plants processing SBO; prohibits the removal
of brains and eyes; prohibits the removal of spinal cord from vertebral column
except in a slaughterhouse.
9. The Specied Bovine Oal (Amendment) Order 1995 (S.L 1995/3246).
Prohibits the use of bovine vertebral column for the mechanical recovery of
meat and the production of certain other products for human consumption;
prohibits the use of meat recovered by mechanical means from the vertebral
column of a bovine animal in food for sale for human consumption; requires
registration of plants recovering meat by
23
26mechanical means from bovine animals; prohibits the export of meat recovered
by mechanical means from bovine vertebral column to other member states.
1996:
10. The Bovine Sponziform Encephalopathy (Amendment) Order 1996 (S.L
1996/962). Prohibits the use of mammalian meat and bone meal in the
preparation of feedingstu for livestock, sh and equine animals.
11. The Fertilizers (Mammalian Meat and Bone Meal) Re~ulations 1996(5.1.
1996/1125). Controls the sale of mammalian meat and bone meal for use as
or in a fertilizer on agricultural land.
12. The Fresh Meat (Hy2iene and Inspection) (A mendment) Re~-ulations 1996
(S.L 1996/1148). Extended the circumstances in which a person may use a
slaughterhouse for the slaughter of animals, the meat of which is not intended
for human consumption.
13. The Heads of Sheep and Goats Order 1996 (S.1 1996/2264). Sets out
controls regarding the removal and disposal of the heads of sheep and goats
after slaughter and prohibits them from entering the human food chain.
1997:
14. The Specied Bovine Material (SBM) Order 1997 (SI 1997/617). Con-
solidates SBM legislations and introduces further controls in relation to use of
SBM in cosmetic, pharmaceutical and medical products, in relation to straining
requirements for SBM, and in relation to the denition of premises which can
use SBM for manufacturing processes.
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27C. US Actions to Minimize Possible Risk
A complete examination of BSE and CJD requires an analysis of the actions
that the USDA and FDA have taken to minimize the potential risk of such
diseases in the United States. Such an analysis is essential in facilitating the
identication of the areas in which the US government needs to take additional
preventive measures. More specically, such an examination allows one to iden-
tify areas in which current US regulation of BSE is lacking in light of the WHO
recommendations and British legislation discussed above.
Department of Agriculture
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for the
health of US livestock. USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service operates
a substantial program for inspecting animals intended for human consumption.
The USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service enforces explicit im-
port regulations covering animals and animal products oered for import into
the US, to prevent the importation of foreign exotic diseases such as Foot-and-
Mouth Disease, Rinderpest, and African Swine Fever. USDA examines all cattle
before they can be approved for use as human food. USDA examines over 33
million head of cattle each year.40
In 1989, the USDA issued restrictive import prohibitions designed to pre-
vent the entry of BSE into US livestock herds. Its aggressive BSE monitoring
program has examined more than 5,100 brains of US cattle exhibiting vari-
ous abnormal behaviors, including neurological symptoms. USDA veterinary
pathologists have performed
40 Center for Veterinary Medicine BSE and CJD Fact Sheet dated January
2, 1997.
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histopathological examinations of brain tissue, as well as immunohistochem-
istry to detect possible spongiform encephalopathy. No evidence of BSE has
ever been found in these US cattle specimens.4'
HHS Protections
Agencies of the US Public Health Service have a long-standing commitment to
research, epidemiological studies, and consumer protection involving BSE and
CJD.
Cattle Feed Restrictions: As recommended by the WHO consulta-
tion in April, the FDA and the livestock industry are moving to ban the use of
ruminant protein in all ruminant feeds. As of August 4, 1997, 21 Code of Fed-
eral Regulations Part 589 became eective, which prohibits the use of animal
proteins in ruminant feed.42
For many years, FDA has carefully reviewed pharmaceutical products mar-
keted in the US for possible or potential contamination with conventional mi-
croorganisms (bacteria, yeast and mold) during their manufacture. In 1990,
FDA intensied its microbiological review of its new drug applications for hu-
man drug products derived from bovine sources. Manufacturers are required
to document that: animal tissues used in the manufacturer of these drug prod-
ucts did not originate in a country where native cattle have been diagnosed
with BSE; the animals had been inspected by the source country's veterinary
authorities, both before and after slaughter; and that the animals are suitable
for food use. As a condition of approval, drug manufacturers of bovine-derived
pharmaceuticals are required to report outbreaks of BSE in countries where the
bovine
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29materials originate. Also, in 1992 and 1996 FDA issued a series of letters ad-
vising all manufacturers of FDA regulated products derived from bovine tissue
materials that source materials should not come from cattle that ever resided
in a BSE country.43
Research: The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has long been ac-
tively researching CJD and kuru, a related disease among humans, and BSE in
animals. NIH research has independently conrmed ndings to date from the
Department of Agriculture and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). In the 1 960s and 1 970s, a Nobel Pnze-wmnning team at the NIH lab-
oratory of Central Nervous System Studies conducted experiments on the oral
transmission of CJD, kuru and scrapie (a similar disease that aects sheep and
goats).44 Today, researchers in the US and around the world are collaborating
in the search for methods to detect, prevent and treat prion-linked diseases.
NIH scientists are providing input to the current investigation of the ten cases
of variant CJD in the UK and have developed a diagnostic test that can be per-
formed before death. This collaboration between NIH and international experts
fuels the ongoing search for clues that one day might lead to a treatment for
this group of diseases.45
Disease Surveillance: The Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) in Atlanta conduct surveillance for CJD through direct examination
of death certicate data for US residents. Based on this surveillance, during the
period 1979 to 1993, the annual incidence of CJD remained stable at approxi-
mately one case per million persons. In light of concern about the new variant
CJD cases in the UK, CDC is working with the Council
42 Federal Register: June 5, 1997 (Volume 62, Number 108), page 30935-
30978.
Id at page 2.
Id.
Id.
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30of State and Territorial Epidemiologists to expand current CJD surveillance.
CDC is piloting enhanced surveillance eorts, including an active search for
variant CJD as described in the UK. This enhanced surveillance is coordinated
through CDC's Emerging Infections Programs in Minnesota, Oregon, Connecti-
cut and California.46
Id at 2-3.
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On March 29, 1996, the beef and sheep industries and veterinary medical groups
announced their implementation of a voluntary ban on ruminant-to-ruminant
feed as a safeguard against BSE. The groups supporting the voluntary ban in-
cluded the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, the American Sheep Industry
Association, the National Milk Producers Federation, the American Veterinary
Medical Association, the American Association of Bovine Practitioners and the
American Association of Veterinary Medical Colleges.47 The voluntary ban was
in response to the BSE epidemic in Britain in March of the same year.
At the time of the voluntary ban, the FDA had yet to implement any rule
or regulation prohibiting the use of animal proteins in animal feed.48 While
21 CFR Part 589 (as discussed below) negates the need for such a voluntary
ban by prohibiting ruminant-to-ruminant feed, such a voluntary ban sends an
interesting signal to the FDA. The voluntary ban indicates the cattle industry's
willingness to embrace and comply with the ruminant-to-ruminant prohibitions.
While rendering facility and slaughter house practices must still be policed by
the FDA to ensure regulatory compliance, the industry has an extremely strong
economic incentive to fully comply with the regulations in an attempt to prevent
an outbreak of BSE in the United States. While the industry's incentive is
clearly not a humanitarian one, its eect is equally satisfying. Simply put, the
cattle industry stands to suer nancially if an outbreak of BSE occurs in the
United
~ See Note 21.
48 Safeguards Against Mad-Cow Disease Planned in US; by Lawrence K.
Altman; New York Times, March30, 1996.
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32States, thus a high level of voluntary compliance with the now mandatory statu-
tory prohibitions is quite likely.
21 CFR Part 589
Proposal Discussion: The FDA-CVM and the Oce of Consumer Af-
fairs sponsored a public meeting February 13, 1997 for consumers regarding Fed-
eral Register 21 CFR Part 589, which was designed to protect against BSE.49
The meeting was designed to provide a forum for industry and consumers to
provide comment on the proposed rule which was published in the Federal Reg-
ister of January 3, 1997.50 FDA published a proposed rule that would regulate
persons that manufacture, blend, process and distribute certain animal pro-
tein products and ruminant feeds containing such products. The proposed rule
would have created a new Sec. 589.2000 entitled Animal proteins prohibited in
ruminant feed . In general, the proposed rule would state that protein derived
from ruminant and mink tissues is not generally recognized as safe (GRAS)
for use in ruminant feed, but rather a food additive subject to certain require-
ments under the Act. The proposed rule would also require certain cautionary
statements on products that contain or may contain such proteins, and estab-
lish recordkeeping requirements. These proposed recordkeeping requirements
were intended to facilitate compliance with the rule. For example, an invoice
obtained from a feed manufacturer for a protein product not labeled with the
cautionary statement could be used to trace the product back to the supplier to
ensure that the supplier manufacturers and distributes animal protein products
from nonruminant sources. The proposed rule also would reduce or eliminate
certain
'~ See FDA-CVM BSE Open Forum Transcript. Said Public Meeting was
held Thursday, February 13,
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33regulatory requirements upon the development of methods for detecting or de-
activating TSE agents, or for verifying product identity.
The proposed rule was the latest in a series of preventive measures that FDA,
other federal agencies, and industry have taken to protect animals from trans-
missible degenerative neurological diseases, including BSE, and to minimize any
potential risk that such diseases could be transmitted from animals to humans.
The preamble to the proposed restriction also contained ve alternatives to the
proposed restriction on the use of ruminant protein in ruminant feed. These al-
ternatives included a restriction on the use of all ruminant and mink materials
(except those that have not been found to present a risk of transmitting TSEs)
in ruminant feed, a restriction on the use all mammalian protein in ruminant
feed, a restriction on the use of materials from domestic species (such a sheep,
goats, mink, deer and elk) diagnosed as having TSE, a restriction on the use of
specied sheep and goat oal in ruminant feed, and a no action alternative.52
The FDA's proposal to ban ruminant-to-ruminant feed was seen as problem-
atic by many industry members as well as consumers. The agency received over
700 comments on the proposed rule and 60 comments on the codied provisions
of the draft nal rule.53 The comments came from a wide variety of organi-
zations, such as cattlemen, renderers, feed manufacturers, and pharmaceutical
rms, federal agencies, foreign governments,
1997 at the Holiday Inn-Capitol; Washington DC.
62 FR 552
~' 21 CFR Part 589 at 30936
52 Id.
~ 21 CFR Part 589 at 30937.
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34State agricultural departments, trade associations, professional organizations,
universities and research institutions, consumer organizations and individual
consumers.54
A large number of comments encouraged FDA to increase the scope of the
regulations to include a partial or complete mammalian-to-ruminant prohibition
or a mammalian-to-farm animal prohibition, or to apply a feed prohibition on all
food-producing animals, either to achieve a greater reduction in the potential
risk of human exposure or easier compliance with less need for enforcement
actions. For example, a few comments asked that the proposed regulations be
expanded to prohibit the feeding of ruminant proteins to felines and zoo animals,
and the feeding of proteins from these animals to ruminants. Some comments
noted the presence of scrapie and other TSE diseases in the United States and
the epidemiological association between scrapie or a modied scrapie agent and
BSE in the United Kingdom in support of enlarging the scope of the rule. One
comment requested a ban on the feeding of all animal remains to other animals,
regardless of species or processing method. Another comment noted that the
specications for tallow allowed for the presence of a small amount of protein
and the possibility of a protein-associated infectivity.55 Consider the following
comments in favoring a more restrictive rule:56
Dr. Michael of the Consumers Union commends the FDA for considering
steps to prevent the possible occurrence and spread of the TSEs in ruminants.
However, we feel that the current proposed action, which is prohibiting the use
of ruminant or mink
~ Id.
~ Id at 30938.
56 See Note 36 at 16. Comments made during the forum's open comment period.
32
35Id at 16.
proteins in ruminant feed, is not suciently protective of the public health.
In fact, we don't feel that any of the six options are currently protective of
public health.
Because TSEs may occur in pigs and chickens as well as ruminants and
because TSEs are believed to be transmissible to humans and because of the
severity of the risk, FDA should take a more prudent approach. To fully protect
public health, we are urging the FDA to basically do what was done in Britain,
and that is to prohibit the use of any mammalian animal protein in food or any
food animal. That's what they are doing in Britain and our basic concern are,
leading us to think why we should be banning all mammalian protein in use of
animal feed...57
Caroline Smith DeWaal, Center for Science in the Public Interest stated,
When the rst case of BSE is documented in this country, the failure to act
by this agency, by USDA, and any other agency with involvement here will be
catastrophic. It'll be catastrophic to the cattle industry. It'll be catastrophic to
American consumers. We saw the impact in Great Britain. We can leam from
that example.
Cost benet analysis should not be used to weaken the public's health pro-
tections which are needed to address this problem. The benet to consumers
of avoiding a fatal brain disease is not quantiable and they are willing to take
whatever steps, to see the agencies take whatever steps so they can avoid that
risk. Were lucky because we're dealing with a situation where we think it hasn't
been found yet in this country. We can almost entirely avoid the risk if we take
the proper prophylactic steps right now, and its up to the government agencies
involved to take those steps.
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We believe the risks to American consumers have not been adequately as-
sessed. We've heard numbers, 5,100 brains have been examined since 1990 or
maybe 1989, who knows. The bottom line is, that's not really enough to give
us tremendous condence that it doesn't exist. In addition, we do know that
CJD, the TSE most commonly found or associated with humans, does arise
spontaneously and so it is likely that it does exist in low levels in this country.
Therefore, we urge the agency to take prophylactic protection and we sup-
port nothing less protective than the ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban which you
have proposed. In addition, we think that Consumers Union's proposal for a
mammal-to-all-farm animal ban should be carefully considered by the agency
and should be adopted if it is, in fact, more protective of public health.
I also have to note that the absence of inspection of feed mills is troubling. I
don't see how you can enforce this rule without inspections, and simply having
a paperwork inspection system, as we know because of the work on HACCP,
isn't going to be enough to satisfy American consumers that enforcement is
really occurring. So I think you need to look at the issue of whether you have
adequate inspection frequency of these plants and how you plan to enforce it.
That isn't really adequately addressed in the rule.58
Ms. Linda Golodner of the National Consumers League took the position
that the National Consumers League supports the Food and Drug Administra-
tion proposal to prohibit using tissue from ruminants, from cows, sheep, goats,
and other animals in the
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37manufacture of ruminant feed, and we would urge you to seriously consider
the comments of Consumers Union to expand precautionary measures to assure
safety.
The American public depends on its government regulatory agencies to take
all reasonable precautions to prevent BSE from arriving at our shores. Our na-
tion has a history of taking measures of protecting its citizens from questionable
foods, animal and plant diseases, and viruses. Consumers traveling across the
borders and sometimes from state to state recognize and accept the strict rules
that are meant to protect us from human infection and infections of our animal
and plant life. This is why we applaud the actions of the FDA and we recognize
the safeguard to ensure that the spread of BSE is highly restricted. While the
FDA is protecting our animal population with a potential of protecting the pub-
lic from the possibility of CJD, the United States Department of Agriculture
has not yet acted to assure the American public that meat does not contain
spinal cord and other nerve tissues. I recognize that the FDA called this public
meeting, but the American public considers the government the government and
that the FDA and the USDA work together.
There is evidence that there is spinal cord tissue and brain stem tissue in
product derived from advanced meat recovery (AMR) systems used by major
processors in the US. This so-called meat has been analyzed by experts at the
University of Nebraska in 1995 and they found spinal cord presence. The FSIS
veterinary pathologists in Athens, Georgia, the regional laboratory of the Agri-
cultural Research Service, found spinal cord and brain stem tissue in AMR
samples. And while the FDA is taking precautionary measures to assure that
animals are safe, the USDA has not responded to this evidence of spinal cord
in our meat supply. There is also evidence of marrow in the AMR product.
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We urge the FDA to work with the USDA to assure that all these products
are safe. It is irresponsible and dangerous to delay actions and the FSIS should
ban the use of neck and backbones in the AMR system. We applaud the FDA
for its proposed regulation to protect animals and we urge you to get the USDA
to follow your lead.59
Richard Wood of the Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT) reected the
position of FACT in saying that FACT is a nonprot organization that advocates
better farming practices to improve the safety of meat, milk and eggs. We have
participated in the FDA and USDA steps responding to concerns about BSE
and TSE to the best of our ability...
We support the implementation of the proposed rule prohibiting the use of
ruminant-derived protein in feed for ruminants. We believe this rule addresses
the wellbeing of both the public and the well-being of the food animal industry.
Without this prohibition, the public is at risk to a disease that is fatal if con-
tracted. Without this prohibition, the industry is vulnerable, as we have seen,
to the same devastating consequences experienced in England. And since we are
dealing with a disease that has an extremely long incubation period and cur-
rently there is no adequate diagnostic test to determine its presence in animals,
furthermore, it appears to be linked to a fatal human illness, in this circum-
stance, both the public and the industry should welcome new regulations. We
would expect that any opposition to the regulation will be short-lived.
Nothing less than a prohibition on using ruminant-derived protein to feed
ruminants is acceptable to us. The alternative proposals oered by the rule allow
for too great a risk regarding undetected TSE in tissues or in other animals in
the herd or ock. On the other hand, FACT is not opposed to a more stringent
ban than what has been
36
39proposed, such as a mammal-to-ruminant prohibition, particularly if it simplies
the regulation's enforcement and compliance.
The proposed regulatory requirements need to be strengthened, though,
where both ruminant and non-ruminant materials are handled by a rm. The
rule requires that rms establish separate equipment and facilities or clean-up
procedures to prevent cross-contamination. The only verication regarding the
integrity of this process in our records are written procedures to be maintained
by the rm. FACT wants on-site inspection by the FDA to visually determine
that ruminant and non-ruminant materials can be handled separately through-
out the processing and shipping. This inspection could be facilitated if there
were tests to determine the presence of BSE or test to distinguish between rumi-
nant and non-ruminant proteins, and, of course, these tests do not exist. FACT
calls on the FDA to encourage the development of such tests.60
Other comments supported a minimalist approach. For example, a signi-
cant number of comments pointed out that BSE has not been diagnosed in the
United States despite a most exhaustive surveillance eort by Federal and State
veterinary laboratory diagnosticians, veterinarians accredited by the USDA, and
veterinary practitioners who have been specically trained to diagnose the early
clinical signs of BSE in cattle. The USDA, through statutes administered by the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS), has taken actions to ensure that the border defenses
against importing the BSE agent are as secure as possible. FDA has advised
manufacturers of human and animal drugs and devices, human biologics, dietary
supplements, and cosmetics to obtain bovine derived ingredients from countries
37
40which are free of BSE. Some comments stated that the adoption by industry
of voluntary measures to avoid the rendering of fallen sheep or sale of sheep
proteins for use in ruminant rations, or to stop the feeding of ruminant proteins
to ruminants are sucient, and no regulation is warranted. Other comments
reminded the agency of its public statements that the risk of BSE occurring in
the United States is low and getting lower. A comment from a foreign regulatory
ocial observed that zero risk cannot be achieved and that the calculation of
risk through a mathematical model is essential; this comment also expressed the
view that the agency's proposed regulatory approach exceeded the risk of BSE
in the United States.6'
Final Rule: FDA continues to believe, as it stated in the preamble
to the proposed rule, that it is prudent to take action prohibiting the use of
certain animal protein products in ruminant feed even though BSE has not
been diagnosed in the United States and there is scientic uncertainty as to its
origin, transmissibility, etc.62
On June 5, 1997 the FDA announced that is was amending its regulations to
provide that animal protein derived from mammalian tissues for use in ruminant
feed is a food additive subject to certain provisions in the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (The Act).63 The Act denes a food additive as any substance
the intended use of which results or may reasonably be expected to result,
directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise aecting the
characteristics of any food.. . if such substance is not generally recognized,
among experts qualied by scientic training and
~ Id at 19-20.
61 See Note 40 at 30938.
62 Federal Register: June 5, 1997 (Volume 62, Number 108). Rules and Regu-
lations page 30936.
63 Id.
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41experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown through
scientic procedures (or, in the case of a substance used in food prior to January
1, 1958, through either scientic procedures or experience based on common use
in food) to be safe under the conditions of its intended use.64
Expert opinion that the tissues are GRAS would need to be supported by
scientic literature, and other sources of data and information, establishing
that there is a reasonable certainty that the material is not harmful under the
intended conditions of use. Expert opinion would need to address topics such
as whether it is reasonably certain that BSE does not, or will not occur in the
US; whether it is reasonably certain that the BSE agent will not be transmitted
through animal feed, i.e., that the processed tissues are not infected by the
agent, are deactivated by the rendering process or are not transmitted orally;
and whether it is reasonably certain that the agent will not be transmitted
to humans through consumption of ruminant products. General recognition
cannot be based on an absence of studies that demonstrate that a substance
is unsafe; there must be studies to establish that the substance is safe. Also,
the burden of establishing that a substance is GRAS is on the proponent of the
substance.65
The nal rule also establishes a exible system of controls designed to ensure
that ruminant feed does not contain animal protein derived from mammalian
tissues and to encourage innovation in such controls. Thus, under the Agency's
authority in section 701(a) of the Act66 to issue regulations for the ecient
enforcement of the Act, this nal rule places three general requirements on
persons that manufacture, blend, process,
~ See Section 201(s) of the Act (21 U.S.C. 321(s)).
65 See U.S. v. An Article of Food *** Coco Rico, 752 F.2d 11(1St Cir. 1985).
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42distribute or use products that contain or may contain protein derived from
mammalian tissues, and feeds made from such products. The rst requirement
is for cautionary labeling of these products with direct language developed by
the FDA.67
The second requirement is for the above mentioned establishments to main-
tain and make available to FDA records that are sucient to track any material
that contains any protein derived from mammalian tissues68 throughout the
material's receipt, processing and distribution. Based on available information,
FDA believes that maintenance of such records is a usual and customary part
of normal business activities for such rms. Therefore, this recordkeeping re-
quirement creates no paperwork burden.69
The third requirement is that individuals or rms that manufacture, blend,
process or distribute both mammalian and nonmammalian materials must main-
tain written procedures to prevent commingling and cross-contamination. An
estimate of the burden resulting from this recordkeeping requirement is pro-
vided below.70 During the 45-day comment period provided by the proposed
rule, FDA received no comments regarding the requirement that individuals
or rms that must maintain written procedures to prevent commingling and
cross-contamination. Thus, the FDA received no comments that
~21 USC 371(a)
67 See 21 CFR Part 589.2000(c)(1)(i); (d)(4); (e)(1)(i) and (f).
68 As dened in Section 589.2000(a)(l), which reads as follows: Protein
derived from mammalian tissues
means any-protein-containing portion of mammalian animals, excluding:
Blood and blood products; gelatin; inspected meat products which have been
cooked and oered for human food
and further heat processed for feed (such as plate waste and used cellulosic
food casings); milk
products (milk and milk proteins); and any product whose only mammalian
protein consists entirely of porcine or equine protein.
6962 FR 108 at 30975.
70 Id.
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suggested that the recordkeeping requirements were overly burdensome or
did not maximize utility.
The nal rule is intended to prevent the establishment and amplication of
BSE in the United States through feed and thereby minimize any risk to animals
and humans. This nal rule becomes eective on August 4, l997.~'
With regard to the scope of the nal rule, protein derived from mammalian
tissues includes both ruminant and nonruminant tissues. FDA's basis for its
nonGRAS determination for ruminant and mink tissue is discussed extensively
in the preamble to the proposed rule and no information was submitted to
refute that determination. With regard to nonruminant tissue besides milk,
such tissues may include animals such as cats, dogs, horses, swine, etc. As the
preamble to the proposed rule discussed concerning a mammalian-to-ruminant
prohibition,72 industry comments indicated that the usual practice at feed mills
and rendering facilities is to commingle ruminant and nonruminant protein
products. FDA indicated that regular commingling could provide a basis to
determine that protein from mammalian tissues is not GRAS for use in rumi-
nant feed. The description of industry practice received in comments on the
proposed rule again indicated that the practice is to commingle ruminant and
nonruminant protein.73
Because of the potential TSE infectivity caused by mixing tissues from rumi-
nant and mink and other mammalian tissues, FDA has determined that protein
derived from mammalian tissues (with, certain exceptions) is not GRAS for use
in ruminant feed. FDA notes that the ruminant-to-ruminant prohibition in the
proposed rule also would
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44have prohibited the use in ruminant feed of this commingled tissue because the
denition of protein derived form ruminant and mink tissue would apply to pure
ruminant or mink tissue as well as other mammalian tissue that could contain
ruminant or mink protein due to commingling. The nal rule also reduces the
risk of cattle and other ruminants being exposed to an agent that causes feline
spongiform encephalopathy and acknowledges that feline protein could be a
commingled component of mammalian protein products.74
VI. Recommendations / Conclusion
The nal rule75 restricts the use of protein derived from mammalian tissues,
with certain exceptions, in ruminant feed. Thus the nal rule represents a reg-
ulatory approach that covers more material and is easier to implement than
the proposed restriction on the use of ruminant protein in ruminant feed, but is
more exible and better suited to current industry practices than the alternative
restriction of all mammalian protein in ruminant feed. Yet, while the United
States has taken several important armative steps to minimize the threat of
BSE and CJD in the US, additional actions could be taken by various govern-
mental agencies which would increase the eectiveness of the current regulatory
regime.
First, much additional research needs to be performed in this area. Our
statutory regime is currently based on highly speculative and controversial infor-
mation. Scientists know precious little about Bovine Spongiform Encephalopa-
thy and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease. The existence of prions is also a relatively
new discovery, hence scientists do
~ 62 FR 108 at 30937.
~ Id.
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45not fully understand how they transmit diseases or how they can be destroyed
once infected. Additional research and surveillance needs to be conducted both
separately and jointly by several governmental agencies. The National Institute
of Health, CVM Oce of Science, USDA and CDC all need to continue their
research into BSE and CJD. An increased understanding of these fatal diseases
will facilitate the promulgation of future regulations that will more eectively
and eciently minimize the threat of a future outbreak in the United States.
Additionally, The FDA should expand its record keeping requirements for
cattle ranchers. British legislation requires cattle ranchers to maintain extensive
breeding, feed, immunization, health and auction records for their herds. The
maintenance of such records will allow authorities to more accurately trace the
origins and cause of a future outbreak of BSE or CJD. If an outbreak of either
of these diseases does occur in the future, insight into rancher's breeding and
feeding patterns could prove invaluable in preventing additional occurrences.
Furthermore, the marginal cost of maintaining such records would prove to be
quite low in that many cattle ranchers already maintain extensive records to
satisfy their own informational needs.
British legislation also prohibits the use of mammalian tissues in fertilizers
that are to be applied to agricultural land.76 The FDA should consider a similar
prohibition until scientists are better able to identify how BSE and CJD are
transmitted. Scientists are not currently able to rule out the possibility that
these diseases may be transmitted through crops which are exposed to fertilizer
contaminated with BSE.
~~21 CFR Part 589
76 See Number 11 at page 26.
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46The FDA also needs to consider implementing on-site inspections to ensure
the integrity of slaughterhouse and rendering facility procedures mandated by
the nal rule. Currently the integrity of the system is veried only through
written records maintained on-site by the private rms. While the industry's
voluntary ban signies the industry's willingness to adhere to the regulations,
even a minimal level of on-site inspections would surely increase compliance and
promote consumer condence in rendering facility and slaughterhouse processes.
Finally, as suggested by Linda Goldoner of the National Consumers League,77
the USDA could greatly reduce the threat of BSE and CJD by further regulat-
ing facilities which employ advanced mechanical meat recovery processes. Such
facilities should be banned from recovering meat from the neck and vertebral
column of cattle. Such safeguards would help reduce the presence of spinal tis-
sue in our nation's meat supply, which would in turn reduce the likelihood of
transmission of CJD to consumers of meat infected with BSE. Plants using such
advanced recovery methods would be required to register with the USDA, and
the USDA would employ some minimal level of on-site inspections to ensure
compliance.
While the US government has taken important steps to minimize the threat
of a future outbreak of BSE and CJD in the United States, employment of
the additional actions recommended above would greatly strengthen the current
regulatory regime. Additionally, the above recommendations would increase the
eectiveness our statutory framework to a level parallel to those recommended
by the WHO and employed by the United Kingdom. Only once all available
preventive measures are taken will our
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47statutory framework be complete, and only then will American consumers be
able to regain condence that their food supply is the safest in the world.
See Linda Golodner's comment at page 34.
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